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Different organizational structures are better matched to certain mission types than others 
(organizational congruence).  Consequently, one way to achieve superior mission 
effectiveness is to switch between organizational structures when circumstances dictate.  
However, little is known about the variables that signal the need for such structural 
adaptation.   To explore this issue, we used a model-based design process to create 
mission scenarios that were either matched (congruent) or mismatched (incongruent) with 
two organizational structures (Functional, Divisional).  Results indicated that, as 
predicted on the basis of the coordination requirements imposed by the model-based 
design process, performance in the incongruent cases was characterized by increased 
communication, increased perceived workload, and degraded performance.   Given these 
overall results, we explored these data further by analyzing communication patterns to 
identify how the organizations attempted to cope with the congruence problem.  Our 
results indicated that the communication strategies employed in the face of incongruence 
depended on organizational structure/mission scenario pairings, suggesting that the 




Mission effectiveness depends on a number of factors, ranging from training excellence 
to technical superiority to effective planning.  In the work reported here, we focus on one 
contributing factor, “congruence,” which has until recent years gone largely unaddressed.  
From a human engineering perspective, congruence is about the “fit” between 
organizational structures, technology, people, and mission requirements.  Mission 
effectiveness can be optimized when these items are well matched.  In particular, here we 
focus on the central theme of the Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control 
(A2C2) Research Program, which is creation of organizations that fit mission 
requirements.   
                                                 
* The research reported here was sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-02-C-
0233, under the direction of Gerald Malecki.   
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Broadly speaking, different organizations may be better matched to certain missions than 
others, and in fact, empirical results indicate that modeling techniques can be used to 
design organizations such that there is a tight fit or alignment between their structures and 
mission requirements (e.g., Entin, 1999; Hocevar, 2000; Hutchins, Hocevar, Kemple, 
Kleinman, Entin, and Serfaty, 2000; Levchuk, Merina, Levchuk, Pattipati, & Kleinman, 
2001).  In other words, organizational effectiveness can be mediated by the congruence 
between an organization’s structural design and an environment or task (e.g., Donaldson, 
2001; Van de Ven & Drazin, 1985).  If organizational structure is out of “alignment” with 
the organization’s mission, then quality of performance should be reduced.  Performance 
may be affected by whether the right person has the right resources at the right place at 
the right time.    
 
Accordingly, one way to achieve superior mission effectiveness may be to change 
organizational structures when circumstances dictate in order to achieve a better fit.  
However, little is known about when and how organizations can and should adapt their 
structures, and about the variables that signal the need for such structural adaptation. This 
paper addresses this issue by focusing on an experimental study of how organizations 
cope with incongruence.  Based on our modeling approach, our empirical strategy was to 
contrast performance under conditions in which organizational structures and missions 
were congruent with performance under conditions in which they were incongruent.   
 
Ultimately, through this work, our goal is to identify “leading indicators” that signal the 
need to adapt organizational structure in order to enhance mission effectiveness.  We 
define leading indicators as measures that signal that an organization is “out of 
alignment” with its mission and needs to change its structure to improve performance.  
However, the ability to accurately identify leading indicators depends on the creation of 
conditions in which an organizational structure is measurably incongruent with its 
mission, and in which this incongruence results in significant performance decrements. 
Given the presence of observed decreases in performance due to incongruence, we can 
then ask what observable behaviors were present that could be used as signals of 
misalignment. 
 
Toward this goal, this paper addresses: 1) The effectiveness of our model-based 
congruence manipulation, as fully presented in Kleinman, Levchuk, Hutchins, & Kemple 
(2003) and Levchuk, Kleinman, Ruan, & Pattipati (2003); and 2) The ways in which the 
organizations studied attempted to cope with incongruence.  In this paper, we address 
these items by focusing on performance measures over the entire mission scenarios.  In 
this manner, we verify the basic manipulation and provide initial insight into how 
incongruence affected organizational performance and process.  This work therefore 
speaks to identification of leading indicators.  Moreover, this work sets the stage for 
exploration of performance and process changes over time, as presented in our 
companion paper, Entin, Diedrich, Kleinman, Kemple, Hocevar, Rubineau, & Serfaty 
(2003), which directly addresses what incongruence looks like in action.  This second 
paper focuses on performance and processes over time, for ultimately, the goal is to 
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identify the state of incongruence early in a mission, long before performance 
significantly depreciates.   
 
Engineering of Organizational Congruence 
 
Our research strategy is to use a set of modeling techniques to design organizational 
structures and mission scenarios.  The modeling techniques, based on a variety of 
approaches (e.g., Carley & Lee, 1998; Handley, Zaidi, & Levis, 1999; Levchuk, Levchuk, 
Luo, Pattipati, & Kleinman, 2002a, 2002b), are used first for organizational design and 
then for simulation to evaluate proposed designs prior to implementation and 
experimentation.  In the case presented here, our basic approach to studying congruence 
was to define two disparate organizational structures and then design two missions 
(scenarios) that exploited the differences between the two structures.  Thus, the objective 
was for the first mission scenario to be “matched” to organization 1 through a high degree 
of congruence, while also being “mismatched” (i.e., exhibit low congruence) with 
organization 2.  The goal was for the reverse to be true for the second scenario.  The 
organizational structures and scenarios were implemented through the use of the 
Distributed Dynamic Decision-making (DDD) simulation testbed.   
 
We begin by addressing the creation of the organizations and mission scenarios used to 
investigate the congruence concept.  In this paper, we briefly outline the strategy, whereas 
complete details can be found in Kleinman et al. (2003) and Levchuk et al. (2003).   





Building on previous work (Diedrich, Hocevar, Entin, Hutchins, Kemple, & Kleinman, 
2002; Hutchins, Kleinman, Hocevar, Kemple, & Porter, 2001; Moon, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, 
West, Ellis, Humphrey, & Porter, 2000), the two organizational structures that we 
explored are commonly referred to as Functional (F) and Divisional (D).  The functional 
structure was organized such that each participant specialized in one or two aspects of a 
mission such as Strike or Air Warfare, where the specific assets controlled were 
distributed across multiple platforms (ships).  In contrast, in the divisional structure, each 
participant had control over a single multifunctional platform that was able to process a 
variety of functional tasks in a given location.   
 
These organizational structures are illustrated in Table 1, which shows the asset 
ownership for the two structures.  Note that within the DDD, organizational structure is 
operationally defined on the basis of asset ownership and location.  However, more 
generally, this operational definition reflects differences in roles (single vs. 
multifunctional areas) and geographic responsibilities (local vs. global responsibility in 
area of operations).  For instance, in the functional organization (Table 1, columns), each 
of the six decision makers (DMs) had control over one (or two) areas (Strike, BMD, ISR, 
AWC, SuWC/Mines, SOF/SAR) with assets assigned across all of the geographical areas 
(e.g., F18S, Anti-ballistic missiles, UAVs, F18A, etc.).  In contrast, in the divisional 
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organization (Table 1, rows), each of the six DMs controlled assets across almost all of 
the functional areas, but these assets were concentrated in proximity to their primary 
platform (ship).  Figure 1 shows the overall view of the area of operations, where the 
primary platforms are indicated by their colors and specifications.   Note that the ranges 
of the various assets varied depending on the qualities of the modeled systems.  
1 2 3 4 5 6
Platform STRIKE BMD ISR SuWC/MINES
1 CVN 2F18S xxx 1UAV 2F18A, E2C 1FAB, 1MH53 1HH60
2 DDGA 8TLAM 3ABM,4TTOM 1UAV 6SM2 1FAB, 2HARP 1HH60,1SOF
3 DDGB 8TLAM 3ABM,4TTOM 1UAV 6SM2 1FAB, 2HARP 1HH60,1SOF
4 8TLAM 3ABM 1UAV 6SM2 1FAB,2HARP,1MH53 1HH60
5 FFG* 2F18S xxx 1UAV 2F18A,E2C,4SM2 1FAB,2HARP,1MH53 1HH60







Table 1. Organizational structures where the functional organization (F) is indicated in 
columns and the divisional organization (D) is indicated in rows. 
 
Figure 1. Simulation interface display showing battle space. 
    
Design of Mission Scenarios 
 
Given these organizational structures, our goal was to use the modeling process to design 
a functional scenario (f) that fit the functional organization (F), while being misfit to the 
divisional organization (D).  Similarly, we wanted to design a divisional scenario (d) that 
fit D but not F.  Several factors went into the design of these two scenarios (see also, 
Kleinman et al., 2003), but there were two primary strategies:  First, we manipulated the 
selection of resource requirements needed to accomplish particular tasks within the 
scenarios.  Note that the two organizations differed primarily with regard to the assets 
(and hence the resource capabilities) that each DM owned.  In the models used to design 
the scenarios, the degree of predicted (structural) congruence is inversely related to the 
amount of inter-DM coordination needed to accomplish the mission.  Therefore, by 
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adjusting the resource requirements of selected tasks it is possible to manipulate the inter-
player coordination needed to successfully prosecute selected tasks for a given 
organization-scenario pairing.  Accordingly, we designed tasks within f such that little 
between-DM coordination would be needed within organization F, while significant 
coordination would be needed by organization D, with the reverse being true for scenario 
d.  For example, a task requiring a single asset in each of three functional areas would 
need three players to coordinate in F, but could be done by a player in D, provided that 
he/she had assets in all of the requisite areas.  Similarly, a task requiring multiple assets in 
a single functional area is well suited to F, but would need multiple players in D to 
coordinate their assets.  In general, this manipulation included all of the key “mission” 
tasks, plus most of the time critical tasks. 
 
Second, we manipulated congruence through the temporal and geographical distribution 
esting Organizational Congruence 
ased on these organizational and mission scenario designs, to test this model-based 
ased on the mission scenarios and organizational definitions, there were three overall 
x The overall level of communications should be higher in the mismatched cases 
verbally to process tasks requiring shared resources). 
of tasks.  These largely involved tasks that had only one or two functional areas 
represented in their resource requirements (air attackers, sea attackers, etc.), and aimed to 
exploit the different geographical responsibilities in D versus F.  Note that in D players 
had responsibilities in a defined area, while in F players had responsibilities that covered 
the entire battle space.  Thus, for example, in scenario d we designed “waves” consisting 
of single functional area attackers (e.g., air) wherein the individual tasks within each 
wave were distributed geographically over several players.  Clearly, this would impose a 
significant load upon one DM (e.g., air warfare) in F in both time and space, but the load 
would be shared among several players in D with little or no coordination needed.  In 
scenario f the attack “waves” consisted of several different functional area tasks where 
each wave targeted a specific player’s area in D.  Thus, we could overload a given player 
in D, but the load would be distributed among several players in F.  Task categories used 
for these manipulations included items such as hostile air and sea platforms, missile 
launchers, search and rescues, and mine clearing tasks. In general, each of the scenarios 





method of engineering organizational congruence, we designed an experiment in which 8 
teams of 6 participants each engaged in both scenarios in one organizational structure.  
Hence, 4 teams performed in D and 4 teams performed in F, and each of these teams 
played both the d and f scenarios (order was counterbalanced across teams).   There were 
two matched (congruent) cases (D-d and F-f) and two mismatched (incongruent) cases 





because, based on the models, coordination requirements were manipulated to be 
much higher in the mismatched cases (i.e., players would have to communicate 
6 
x 
 the mismatched cases, this 
x 
e communications and higher 
 
Note th ictions regarding the overall effects of the experimental 
anipulation.  Validation of these predictions therefore provides evidence that the 
ith incongruence. Within the context of this investigation, the organizations were not 




ficers attending the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, served as 
articipants. Most of the officers were 03 or 04 and several services and nations were 
 
The overall level of workload should be higher in the mismatch cases.   Because 
coordination demands were manipulated to be high in
would result in increased communication requirements and an increased need for 
coordinated actions to prosecute tasks.  Hence, we expected that the perceived 
workload would be higher in the mismatched cases. 
Overall, performance should be worse in the mismatched cases because the 
greater coordination requirements should lead to mor
workloads, resulting in some decrements in the ability to perform multiple tasks 
quickly and accurately.  
at these are general pred
m
experimental manipulations worked as intended, providing us with a “license” to further 
explore in detail how the organizations studied attempted to cope with incongruence, thus 
shedding light on potential “leading indicators” of the need for organizational adaptation.  
 
Hence, beyond these global predictions, we focus our analyses on strategies for coping 
w
permitted to adapt their structures, for instance, from D to F in the context of the 
functional scenario.  Nevertheless, the organizations were free to adapt their strategies as 
they attempted to deal with the mismatched situations.  We believe that these strategies 
might offer insight into leading indicators of the need for change because they reflect 
how an organization attempts to cope with incongruence prior to a change in 
organizational structure.  In other words, it is possible that strategy changes might 
consistently predict the need for structural change, and as such, the strategy changes 
might serve as potential leading indicators. We therefore focused our analyses on 
communications, for communication is the primary mechanism through which the 
organizations could express their attempts to deal collectively with the misfit situations.   
 
Moreover, we also focused our analyses on differences between how the F and D 
o
stated above, our ultimate goal is to understand the signals for change (leading 
indicators).  Consequently, it is imperative to ascertain how organizational structures and 
mission scenarios, which may be more or less congruent, interact to shape the behaviors 
observed.  These behaviors (e.g., strategies) will only serve as valid leading indicators to 





represented.  Participants were organized into eight teams of six individuals each.  




The simulation was implemented within the Distributed Dynamic Decision-making 
ronment.  The DDD is a distributed client server simulation that provides a 
exible framework in which to study individual and team performance.  In general, DDD 
articipants began the experiment by signing an informed consent form and then 
two hours of DDD “buttonology” training to learn how to control the various 
ssets and how to use the various functions contained in the DDD simulation.  A second 
.  Thus, organizational structure was 
anipulated as a between-subjects variable with 4 teams in F and 4 teams in D.   In 
 was captured, whichever came first.  The teams used a 
ariety of sea, land, and air assets to complete a specified mission that included 
(DDD) envi
fl
simulations involve individual (and team) decision-making about complex situations 
based on information and resources provided by the simulation and other team members 
(Serfaty & Kleinman, 1985; Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989).  The simulation enables the 
manipulation of variables such as organizational structure and mission scenario tasking.  
In addition, a variety of performance measures can be recorded including items such as 
tasks processed, latencies, and accuracies.  In this case, the organizational structures were 
implemented in the DDD simulation by varying the ownership of different kinds of 
assets.  Thus, we designed a functional organization (F) and a divisional organization (D), 
as defined in Table 1.  With respect to scenario design, as specified in the above section 
“Engineering of Organizational Congruence,” we varied a number of items in order to 
design the functional (f) and divisional (d) scenarios including task timings, locations, and 







two-hour session provided training designed to provide experience on the skills necessary 
to perform either the divisional or functional scenarios, without creating a bias for either 
kind of scenario.  In general, these training scenarios exposed participants to the general 
mission task flow and the task resource requirements.  However, these training scenarios 
were composites of the actual mission scenarios with respect to resource requirements, 
and as such, neither of the two training scenarios were explicitly designed to favor one 
organizational structure over another.  Following training, each team engaged in a two-
hour data collection session followed by a second two-hour data collection session.  Thus, 
in total, each team participated in four hours of training and four hours of testing over 
four sessions over multiple days. At the end of the experiment, all teams were debriefed 
as to the nature and purpose of the experiment.   
 
Each team was assigned to either the D or F organizational structure, which was 
maintained throughout all training and testing
m
contrast, during each of the two experimental sessions, the teams each performed the d 
scenario and the f scenario.  Thus, scenario was manipulated as a within-subjects variable.  
Across the two sessions, the scenarios were counterbalanced as d-f-f-d for half the teams 
and f-d-d-f for half of the teams. 
 
The experimental scenarios involved a Joint Forces mission that lasted approximately 35 
minutes or until the final Port task
v
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destroying or capturing a command center, two naval bases, two air bases, and a port.  
Along the way, the teams encountered a variety of obstacles including hostile ground, sea, 
and air assets.  In addition, players had to defend neighboring foreign friendly areas from 
SCUD missile attacks, while also defending friendly assets.  Critically, the mission 
environment was significantly characterized by a variety of time-critical tasks (e.g., 
SCUD missile launchers, coastal defense launchers, search and rescue) that required 
immediate response.  The area of operations also contained neutral parties and hostile 
assets that did not directly engage friendly forces, and therefore were deemed to be low 
on the list of priorities as specified by the rules of engagement and commander’s intent.   
 
Although the commander’s intent and rules of engagement were similar across the 
organizational structures, the precise operational roles given to the participants depended
 
 
n organizational structure.  Hence, mission roles stressed multiple functional 
verall, the data collected in the experiment included assessments of performance, 
s, and workload.  These dependent measures were derived from three 
ifferent sources: Instruments completed by trained observers, participant self-report 
o
responsibilities in a given geographic region for the divisional organization, but 
functionally specific responsibilities across the entire area of operations for the functional 
organization. As noted above, in general, in the functional organizational structure a 
participant charged with one aspect of the mission, such as air warfare, “owned” (had 
direct control of) all of the assets necessary to do that part of the mission across the area 
of operations.  In contrast, in the divisional organizational structure, participants had 
direct control over all assets on one multifunctional platform (e.g., a carrier or a guided 
missile cruiser) that was located in a geographically distinct region.  However, there was 
some overlap of range such that multiple assets from multiple DMs could access the same 







measures, and measures derived from the DDD simulator.  Below, we describe the 
instruments employed in each of these areas with respect to global measures.  Time-series 
based measures are presented in Entin et al. (2003).    
 
Performance Measures. In general, the DDD simulator enabled the measurement of 
several variables related to individual and team performance such as latency to process a 
sk, accuracy in processing a task, number of tasks process, the number of task arrivals ta
(tasks in the scenario), etc.  In this paper, we focus on the percent of tasks processed (the 
number of tasks attacked/the number of tasks arrived in the scenario), the accuracy of task 
processing (the ratio of assets applied to assets required for tasks attacked), and the 
latency of tasks attacked (the time from arrival in the scenario to the time of attack).     
 
Team Communications. Using a custom software tool, verbal communications between 
team members were captured by observers at an intermediate level of detail that 
corporated both semantic and quantitative aspects of the communication stream.  In in
brief, during the conduct of a scenario two observers listened to the communications in 
real time, and used specially designed software and a handheld, touch-sensitive computer 
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to code the source, the recipient, the time, and the type of the verbal communications 
among the team members.  One of the observers coded the communication for three of 
the team members, while the other observer coded the communications exhibited by the 
remaining three team members.  Broadly speaking, the types of communications were 
divided into three basic categories: transfers (e.g., provision of information), requests 
(e.g., demands for information), and acknowledgements (e.g., “aye”).  Both transfers and 
requests were, in turn, classified as requests/transfers for/of information (e.g., “Where is 
the enemy aircraft”), action (e.g., “Take the bridge”), or coordination (“I need your help 
on the air base”).   Raters were trained prior to the experiment on the basis of tapes and 
training sessions until reliability was about r = 0.76.   
 
Workload. At five-minute intervals throughout the scenario, each team member was 
prompted by the DDD simulator to provide an estimate of the workload they were 
xperiencing at the moment.  The prompt was in the form of a window that opened on the e
display.  The workload rating was made on a seven point Likert scale anchored at on end 
by the word “low” and the other end by “high.”  The windows, which were mildly 
intrusive, could not be closed until a rating was made.  
 
Participant Impressions.  Following the final session, participants filled out a brief survey 
asking about their impressions regarding indications of reduced performance and their 
pressions regarding potential ways to improve performance.  
verall, we predicted that relative to the congruent cases (D-d, F-f), performance in the 
incongruent cases (D-f, F-d) would be ized by increased communications and 
erceived levels of workload due to the model-based coordination requirements 
ased on the modeling approach, we predicted that the overall level of communications 
mismatched cases because coordination requirements were 








manipulation.   Due to these increased coordination requirements, we also expected that 
performance would be worse in the incongruent cases.  Accordingly, due to our interest in 
congruence, we focused our analyses on the interaction between organizational structure 
and scenario.  Below, we present our results with this emphasis in mind.  In general, we 
evaluated the results through a set of two-within-subjects (scenario and replication) by 
one-between-subjects (structure) mixed-model multivariate analyses of variance.  When 
computing and reporting means we averaged across replications.  We begin by evaluating 





should be higher in the 
m
process tasks requiring shared resources).  Consistent with this prediction, averaged over 
the entire scenario, the overall volume of communications was higher in the incongruent 
cases than in the congruent cases, as demonstrated by a significant structure by scenario 
interaction, F (1, 6) = 38.75, p < 0.002.  This result indicated that the teams talked more 
when faced with incongruent situations (Figure 2).  In addition, there was a greater 
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volume of communications for the d scenario, F (1, 6) = 6.49, p < 0.05, and a marginally 
significant main effect for structure, F (1, 6) = 3.73, p < 0.1.  These results suggested that 
there were more communications in the D organization.  Note in particular that within the 
F organization, the volume of communications almost doubled when going from the f to 
the d scenario, whereas within the D organization, when going from the d to the f scenario 
communications also increased, but to a much lesser degree.  Thus, given these scenarios, 
in response to incongruence, D organizations talked more, but F organizations talked a lot 
more.     




























e also predicted that the overall level of perceived workload should be higher in the 
 Since coordination demands were manipulated through the modeling 




requirements and an increased need for coordinated actions to prosecute mission tasks.  
Hence, we predicted that the perceived workload should be high in the mismatched cases.  
Consistent with this prediction, the overall level of perceived workload tended to be 
higher in the mismatched conditions, although this result was only marginally significant, 
F (1, 6) = 2.59, p < 0.08. As shown in Figure 3, teams performing with the D structure 
tended to report higher workloads when performing the f scenario (incongruent 
condition) as compared to when they were performing the d scenario (congruent 
condition), while teams performing with the F structure tended to report higher workload 
when performing the d scenario (incongruent condition) as compared to when they 
performed the f scenario (congruent condition).  There were no significant main effects 
for either structure (F (1, 6) = 0.35, ns) or scenario (F (1, 6) = 0.04, ns).   Collectively, 



















verall, we predicted that performance should be worse in the mismatch cases because 
 
O
the greater requirements for coordination should lead to more communication and higher 
workload, resulting in some decrements in the ability to perform multiple tasks quickly 
and accurately.  Consistent with this prediction, we found that the overall percentage of 
tasks completed tended to be superior in the matched conditions, F (1, 6) = 50.37, p < 
0.001.  This measure, defined as the number of tasks attacked divided by the number of 
tasks arrived in the simulation (times 100), indicated that in both organizations, 
performance was superior in the congruent cases (Figure 4).  The main effect for 
structure was not significant (F (1, 6) = 0.21, ns), but there was a marginally significant 
main effect for scenario (F (1, 6) = 3.71, p < 0.1).  Collectively, these data suggest that 
teams were less successful at processing the tasks that were present in the incongruent 
cases.   
 
However, with respect to measures of mean accuracy for tasks attacked (resources 
 total, therefore, these data indicated that the congruence manipulation was effective in 
applied/resources needed for tasks processed) and mean latency for tasks attacked (time 
of task processing minus time of task arrival in the game for tasks processed), there were 
no significant main effects or interactions, although with respect to accuracy, the main 
effect for scenario was marginally significant, F (1, 6) = 5.70, p < 0.06.  Nevertheless, 
there was a small trend toward decreased accuracy for organization D in the incongruent 
condition.  Overall, these data collectively suggest that there was a tradeoff between 
tasked processed, accuracy, and latency.  For both organizational structures, while the 
percentage of tasks processed suffered in the incongruent conditions, there were no 
significant drops in accuracy and latency for the tasks that were actually processed.   
 
In
that as predicted, performance was worse in the incongruent conditions with respect to 
the percentage of tasks processed (fewer things got done).  Moreover, as predicted by the 
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model-based manipulation of coordination requirements, communications increased in 
the incongruent cases, especially for the F organization.  Similarly, perceived workload 
also tended to increase in the incongruent conditions.  Given these findings, which 
suggest that the fundamental model-based manipulation of organizational congruence 
was effective, we now turn to the communication strategies the organizations exhibited 
given the scenario/structure pairings.        























s completed for structure and scenario. 
 
ommunication Strategies 
ithin the context of this investigation, the organizations were not permitted to adapt 
o explore this issue, we focused our analyses in particular on communication patterns, 




their structures.  Nevertheless, the organizations were free to adapt their strategies as they 
attempted to deal with the mismatched situations.  Consequently, we believe that these 
strategies might offer insight into leading indicators because they reflect how an 
organization attempts to cope with incongruence.   
 
T
for communication is the primary mechanism through which the organizations could 
express their attempts to deal collectively with the misfit situation.  As noted above, in 
response to incongruence, both the D and F organizations talked more than they did in 
congruent situations.  However, the F organizations tended to talk a great deal more in 
the F-d case as compared to the F-f case.   To further explore this issue, we now address 
not only the volume of communications, but also the patterns of communications. 
 
C ?  To explore the communication patterns, we 
plotted the communication frequencies for each pair of DMs for each scenario-structure 
pairing.  Example plots are shown in Figures 5 and 6.   We then conducted six 
MANOVAs on the various pair wise groupings (Green to others, Purple to others, Orange 
to others, Blue to others, Red to others, and Brown to others).  To clarify, Green was the 
CVN in D and Strike in F; Blue was DDGA in D and BMD in F; Purple was DDGB in D 
and ISR in F; Red was CG in D and AWC in F; Orange was FFG in D and SuWC/Mines 
in F; and Brown was DDGC in D and SOF/SAR in F.  In general, these analyses 
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indicated that for the various positions, communications tended to significantly increase 
with one or more other positions in at least one of the incongruent conditions.  However, 
the nature of the increases depended on the scenario and structure pairings.  For example, 
although Green talked to Brown a bit more in D-f than D-d (there were no differences in 
Brown talking to Green), Brown and Green talked a lot more to each other in F-d as 
compared to F-f.  For these Brown-Green pairings, these interactions between structure 
and scenario were significant, p < 0.01.  Importantly, the model-based design process 
related to coordination requirements predicted many of these differences.  For instance, 
by definition, Green and Brown had to coordinate more in F-d than F-f based on resource 
requirements that demanded cooperation.  Collectively, these data suggest that, relatively 
speaking, who talked to who in response to incongruence depended on organizational 
structure and the particular mission scenario demands.   
Figure 5
 


























































D_d D_f F_d F_f
. Brown’s communications with other team members. 
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Communications: Talking about What? To explore the content of communications, we 
used survival e lengths of 
 
Figure 7
 analysis techniques (Carroll, 1983).  In brief, by looking at th
time between each player's initiation of communications, we derived DM-specific as well 
as overall condition-specific waiting time distribution functions (Tuma and Hannan, 
1984), which in turn yielded incidence rate estimates for communications.  Looking at 
the condition-specific communication rates, congruent and incongruent conditions by 
architecture were statistically compared using the Mantel-Haenszel test (Dupont, 2002).  
This analysis once again showed significant differences between congruent and 
incongruent communication rates in both architectures, controlling for DM-specific 
effects (D: &2(5) =   32.40, p < 0.0001; F: &2(5) = 206.95, p < 0.0001).  To gain insight 
into general communication patterns as well as topic-specific communication patterns, 
we analyzed both an aggregation of all communication types, and separately for the 
coded communication categories. We looked for changes in a given player's rate of 
initiating communications relative to that of his or her team between the congruent and 
incongruent conditions.  First, we constructed each player's role-relative incidence rate 
for communication as the ratio of an individual player's communication incidence rate 
within one experimental condition to the team's communication incidence rate for that 
condition.  Then, we looked at the change in this ratio from the congruent condition to the 
incongruent condition.  Figures 7 and 8 illustrate large ratio changes (absolute value t 
50%) for the Divisional and Functional architectures, respectively (the larger the increase 
or decrease, the more +’s or -’s, respectively). 
 
DM All Task






congruence for Organization D.  This ratio indicates the change in role-relative 
probability from congruent to incongruent scenarios. 
In ge  the 
incongruent scena tion rates by DM 




neral, this analysis revealed a strong distinction in the nature of adaptation to
rio.  For the D structure, the role-relative communica
fo
incongruent scenarios.  Of the 30 observed changes in relative incidence rates (6 DMs by 
5 communication types), there were large changes for only two conditions (Figure 7).  
The columns in Figure 7 refer to all communications, communications about enemy 
tasks, communications about friendly assets, requests for information, and non-requested 
transfers of information.  In contrast, for the F structure, there were strong changes in 
communication types between the congruent and incongruent scenarios for many 
categories.  Of the 30 observed changes in relative incidence rates, there were large 
changes for 21 conditions (Figure 8).  These data indicated that when F organizations 
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went from f to d, the content of communications changed substantially.  However, when 
D organizations went from d to f, communications content changed in more subtle ways. 
 
DM All Task Asset Req Xfer
 
. Role-relative incidence rates for incongruence /role-relative incidence rates for 
Blue -- - - -- -
Purple - -- -- -
Red ++ ++ +++ ++
Orange + +
Brown +++
Green + + + + +
Figure 8
congruence for Organization F.  This ratio indicates the change in role-relative 
Collectively, thes  that when D 
organizations went from congruent to incongruent situations, they reacted by talking 
al reactions to incongruence, a follow-up 
uestionnaire was administered to participants at the end of the experiment to obtain 
 indicators of performance 
ecrement, we collected seventy responses from 48 participants, which were tallied and 
probability from congruent to incongruent scenarios. 
 
e analyses of the communications data showed
more.  However, the changes in the likelihood of particular pairs of DMs talking to each 
other were relatively small as were the changes in communications content.  In contrast, 
when F organizations went from congruent to incongruent situations, they reacted by 
talking more, making substantial changes in whom they talked to, and making substantial 
changes in what they talked about.  These data suggest that the context of being in a 
particular organization given a particular mission influences how organizations react 




To further assess the manipulation, and potenti
q
information regarding what cues participants were aware of that specified that 
performance was beginning to degrade.  In addition, participants were also asked what 
type of changes they thought could have improved performance at the point in the 
scenario when they noticed that performance was beginning to degrade.  This information 
speaks to potential leading indicators of the need to change. 
 
More specifically, with respect to impressions regarding
d
categorized into the categories shown in Table 2.  Two major categories of response, 
uncompleted tasks/less than optimal performance (51%) and communication/ 
coordination demands (23%), comprised 74 % of the responses. Examples of the types of 
responses listed under uncompleted tasks/less than optimal performance included items 
such as loss of situational awareness, not prosecuting tasks, own platforms being hit by 
the enemy, being in a reactive mode (i.e., behind the timeline), not accomplishing 
unanticipated and pop-up missions, not detecting SCUD launches in time to engage them, 
lapse of time for use of an asset, failure to complete time-critical tasks, and not engaging 
a task simultaneously (as required).  With respect to communications/coordination 
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demands, responses included items such as increased communications, too much chatter, 
loss of communications discipline (e.g., people talking over each other, not using call 
signs), talking faster/louder/ increased inflection, slow radio response from others, and 
the inability to coordinate due to increased communications.  Collectively, these 
responses were consistent with the findings reported above, and in addition, they point to 
performance decrements and communications as being likely sources of leading 
indicators.    
 
 





sks/ less than optimal performance 34 
Communication and Coordination demands 16 
Workload 6 















rocess or Structure 23 
Provide Decision Aids and Human-Computer Interaction Improvements 16 
Communications Changes 12 






Table 3.  Participant suggestions to improve degraded performance
When ask improved 
erformance at the point in the scenario when they noticed that performance was 
 
ed about what type of changes participants thought could have 
p
beginning to degrade, participants once again made a variety of responses that we 
grouped into the categories shown in Table 3. One third (thirty-two percent) of the 
suggestions recommended by participants to improve degraded performance pertained to 
adaptation of either the process or the organizational structure, consistent with the goals 
of the research program.  Along these lines, several suggestions involved allowing the 
burden of tasks to be shifted to less-tasked people — on a task-by-task basis — so that 
when one individual became overloaded they could shift assets to another individual who 
would then perform the task in order to level the workload.  Several participants (who 
performed in the D structure) recommended that coordinator positions be established for 
warfare areas along functional vice geographic lines. In addition, twenty-three percent of 
the suggestions regarding ways to improve degraded performance involved providing 
decision aid support to provide an automated means to inform the participant regarding 
various aspects of the scenario.  These suggestions included informing the participants 
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regarding the following conditions:  (1) when assets were available for each mission 
(assets available at that time in the scenario), (2) that an asset is out of ammunition 
(immediately after it conducts its last engagement), (3) that tasks are waiting to be 
completed, and (4) that the time remaining to complete a task is low (e.g., five minutes 
remaining).     
 
Discussion 
Based on the modeling work that lead izational definitions and the scenarios, 
e predicted that relative to the matched cases (D-d and F-f), performance in the 
ications were increased in the 
ismatched conditions, and consistent with these findings, the participants remarked on 
dictions.  Given this 
lobal pattern of results, we take these data as strong evidence that the congruence 
ing Indicators 
t investigation, although the organizations were not 
ermitted to adapt their structures, they were nevertheless free to adapt their strategies as 
 
 to the organ
w
mismatched conditions (D-f and F-d) would be characterized by increased 
communications and increased perceived workload.  In addition, we predicted that 
performance would be worse in the mismatched conditions due to these organization-
scenario demands and, more generally, the limitations imposed by the lack of fit between 
the organizational structures and the mission scenarios.     
 
Overall, our results supported these predictions.  Commun
m
the communications problems associated with the incongruent conditions.     Importantly, 
this change in communications volume likely reflected the model-based manipulation of 
the need for cross-participant coordination, which was the primary tool employed to 
engineer congruence.   Similarly, consistent with these manipulations, the perceived 
workload also increased, although this trend was only marginally significant.  Once again, 
these data were generally consistent with the model-based manipulation of coordination 
requirements.  With respect to measures of performance, which included the percent of 
tasks processed, latencies, and accuracy, results showed reduced performance in the 
mismatched conditions.   Participants in both organizations processed fewer tasks in the 
incongruent cases, and once again, participants in both organizations remarked on the 
performance decrements associated with the incongruent scenarios. 
 
In total, these findings were consistent with the model-based pre
g
manipulation was effective.  Moreover, the validation of these predictions now provides 
us with our “license” to further explore in detail how the organizations studied attempted 
to cope with incongruence, thus shedding light on potential “leading indicators” of the 
need for organizational adaptation.  Here, we address measures averaged over the entire 
mission scenarios.  In our companion paper, Entin et al. (2003), we address measures 




Within the context of the presen
p
they attempted to deal with the mismatched situations.  We believe that these strategies 
might offer insight into leading indicators of the need for change to the extent that they 
reliably reflect how an organization attempts to cope with incongruence.  In general, we 
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define leading indicators as measures that signal that an organization is “out of 
alignment” with its mission and needs to change its structure to improve performance and 
optimize mission effectiveness.  Note that these indicators may be “leading” or “lagging” 
to various degrees.  Ideally, leading indicators would predict the need for change prior to 
any performance decrement.   However, some indicators may first surface as performance 
begins to decline.  For instance, the performance decrements that the participants 
remarked on were likely in this category.  Ultimately, measures taken over time will help 
to clarify the extent to which particular items are truly leading or lagging (Entin et al., 
2003).    
 
In this paper, to explore the issue of leading indicators, we focused our work on 
ommunication strategies.  By strategy, we simply mean the responses that the 
r it suggests that the 
ading indicators, or symptoms of incongruence, may be complex in that they will be 
 these data, the mission scenarios, and the organizations, we believe that we 
re now well positioned to effectively study structural adaptation.  In creating the 
c
organizations made in their communications as they coped with incongruence.   We 
focused on communications because they are the primary mechanisms through which the 
organizations could express their attempts to deal collectively with the misfit situations.  
Our results showed that both organizations talked more when faced with incongruence.  
While the D organizations talked more, however, the F organizations talked a great deal 
more, there were strong differences in the extent to which different people talked to each 
other, and there were robust changes in the content of the communications.   Thus, in 
trying to cope with the incongruence, the F organization reacted differently when going 
from f to d than the D organization when going from d to f.   The organizations reacted 
by increasing communications, but the specific contexts of the missions and 
organizational structures influenced the nature of those reactions.    
 
This finding – that the context mattered – is critically important, fo
le
shaped by the interaction of mission tasks and organizational structures, as well as a 
number of other potential factors such as history of the organization, individual 
proficiencies, fatigue, etc.  This means that the appearance of a particular leading 
indicator such as communication content may be probabilistic rather than absolute, such 
that it might take a set of measures rather than any one in particular to ascertain the state 
of congruence.  We expect that this will be particularly true when larger and more 
complex organizations face larger and more complex missions in the “real world.” 
Consequently, it is imperative to ascertain how organizational structures and mission 
scenarios, which may be more or less congruent or incongruent, interact to shape the 
behaviors observed, for these behaviors (e.g., strategies) will only serve as valid leading 
indicators to the extent that we understand how contextual factors shape organizational 






scenarios examined here, our hope was to engineer conditions that made it advantageous 
for an organization to adapt structure.  Our reasoning was that when the structure of an 
organization becomes too incongruent with its mission, an organization should “feel the 
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pain” and be motivated to change to enhance mission effectiveness.  Collectively, our 
results suggest that we have indeed created conditions in which organizations are 
burdened by coordination requirements.  These results suggest that if given a chance to 
adapt when faced with misalignment (D-f, F-d), the organizations studied here might be 
sufficiently motivated to change their organizational structures in order to gain a state of 
congruence (F-f, D-d).  
 
However, while there is evidence that organizations will institute strategy changes, such 
s those noted above, they also appear to be quite reluctant to make changes to their 
lyses indicates that our model-based manipulations of 
rganizational congruence were successful.  Our results showed that, as predicted, 
Carley, K.M. & Lee, J. (1998). Dynam ns: Organizational Adaptation in a 
Changing Environment. In J. Baum (Ed.), Advances in Strategic Management, Vol. 
Car
a
structures (Entin, Serfaty, and Kerrigan, 1998; Hollenbeck et al., 1999). Hence, either 
adaptation needs to be imposed on an organization from above, or alternatively, it is 
necessary to provide substantial support that moves the organization in the direction of 
change.   Thus, in order to successfully induce and study organizational adaptation that is 
not imposed on an organization, it is necessary to not only create a state of organizational 
pain, but also direct the organization’s awareness to the source of that pain, provide them 
with the knowledge that another mode of organization would be superior, and provide 
them with the tools to adapt.  Similarly, in the case of change imposed on an organization 
from the outside (e.g., via a chain of command), it is necessary to understand the 
behaviors of organizations coping with incongruence such that a commander could make 
a decision to impose change based on an understanding of what incongruence looks like 
in action.  Accordingly, building on these data and those presented in Entin et al. (2003), 
we are now exploring both a variety of measures that could serve collectively as potential 
leading indicators and different ways of presenting that information to organizations to 
support structural adaptation.  In future empirical work our goal will be to study the 
processes of on-line structural adaptation by directing attention toward critical leading 
indicators of the need to change and by exploring how organizations need to be prepared 
in order to change effectively. 
 
In summary, this set of ana
o
relative to the congruent cases, the incongruent cases indeed lead to less effective mission 
performance.  These results demonstrated the power of model-based organizational 
design for optimization of mission effectiveness. Moreover, based on this successful 
manipulation, this work sets the stage for further work on structural adaptation.  Our goal 
is to study the processes that underlie adaptation when an organization moves from one 
structure to another.  The work reported here provides the organizational structures and 
scenarios necessary to explore adaptation, and importantly, the data on which to further 
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